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Abstract	
Within	 just	 over	 one	month	 of	 coming	 into	 operation	 in	May	 2014,	 the	 new	Bail	Act	2013	
(NSW),	a	product	of	 long‐term	 law	reform	consideration,	was	 reviewed	and	 then	amended	
after	talk‐back	radio	‘shock	jock’	and	tabloid	newspaper	outcry	over	three	cases.	This	article	
examines	 the	media	 triggers,	 the	main	arguments	 of	 the	 review	 conducted	by	 former	New	
South	 Wales	 (NSW)	 Attorney	 General	 John	 Hatzistergos,	 and	 the	 amendments,	 with	 our	
analysis	of	the	judicial	interpretation	of	the	Act	thus	far	providing	relevant	background.	We	
argue	 that	 the	 amendments	 are	 premature,	 unnecessary,	 create	 complexity	 and	 confusion,	
and,	quite	possibly,	will	have	unintended	consequences:	in	short,	they	are	a	mess.	The	whole	
process	 of	 reversal	 is	 an	 example	 of	 law	 and	 order	 politics	 driven	 by	 the	 shock	 jocks	 and	
tabloid	media,	the	views	of	which,	are	based	on	fundamental	misconceptions	of	the	purpose	
of	bail	and	its	place	in	the	criminal	process,	resulting	in	a	conflation	of	accusation,	guilt	and	
punishment.	Other	consequences	of	the	review	and	amendments	process	recognised	in	this	
article	 include	 the	 denigration	 of	 judicial	 expertise	 and	 lack	 of	 concern	with	 evidence	 and	
process;	the	disproportionate	influence	of	the	shock	jocks,	tabloids	and	Police	Association	of	
NSW	 on	 policy	 formation;	 the	 practice	 of	 using	 retired	 politicians	 to	 produce	 ‘quick	 fix’	
reviews;	and	the	political	failure	to	understand	and	defend	fundamental	legal	principles	that	
benefit	us	all	and	are	central	to	the	maintenance	of	a	democratic	society	and	the	rule	of	law.	
The	 article	 concludes	 with	 some	 discussion	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 media	 and	 political	 debate	
might	be	conducted	to	produce	more	balanced	outcomes.		
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Introduction	
In	 a	 recent	 article	 in	 the	Alternative	Law	 Journal,	David	 Shoebridge	MP	 (2014:	132)	 stated	 in	
relation	to	the	enactment	of	the	Bail	Act	2013	(NSW)	(‘the	Act’):	
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…	there	is	cause	for	real	hope	that,	come	mid‐2014,	we	will	see	a	new	and	even	
progressive	 bail	 regime	 in	 place	 in	 NSW.	 This	 could	well	 be	 one	 of	 those	 rare	
occasions	where	the	law	and	order	debate	in	NSW	has	been	hijacked	by	principle	
and,	for	once,	the	tabloids	and	shock	jocks	haven’t	even	noticed.	
	
Within	just	five	weeks	of	operation	of	the	new	Act	these	words	have	unfortunately	turned	out	to	
be	a	case	of	speaking	too	soon.	The	tabloid	newspapers	and	the	talk‐back	radio	shock	jocks,	far	
from	 ‘not	noticing’,	 led	a	media	campaign	which	resulted	 in	repudiation	of	key	 features	of	 the	
new	bail	legislation.	This	article	will	examine	how	and	why	this	happened	and	what	it	means	for	
the	conduct	of	criminal	law	reform.		
	
To	set	the	scene,	we	begin	with	the	backstory,	outlining	the	impetus	for	bail	reform	in	NSW,	as	
reflected	 in	 the	 Bail	 report	 of	 the	 NSW	 Law	 Reform	 Commission	 (LRC)	 (2012)	 and	 the	
subsequent	 passing	 of	 the	 new	Act	with	 the	 key	 features	 of	 this	 legislation	 highlighted.	 After	
little	more	 than	 one	month	 in	 operation,	 however,	 the	 new	Act	was	 called	 into	 question	 in	 a	
media	storm	centred	on	three	cases	and	the	NSW	Liberal‐National	Party	Coalition	government	
initiated	 a	 review,	 presided	 over	 by	 former	 Labor	 Party	 (the	 main	 opposing	 party	 to	 the	
Coalition	 in	 NSW)	 Attorney	 General	 John	 Hatzistergos.	 The	 article	 then	 examines	 the	 media	
triggers	for	the	review,	its	major	findings	and	the	government	response	in	the	form	of	amending	
legislation.	It	examines	the	merits	of	the	review	arguments	accepted	by	the	government,	in	the	
light	of	our	detailed	analysis	of	the	reported	bail	decisions1	 in	the	Supreme	Court	and	District	
Court	of	NSW	and	a	selection	of	unreported	decisions2	since	the	Act	came	into	force.	Based	on	
this	analysis,	we	argue	that	the	review	and	the	amendments	are	premature,	unnecessary,	create	
complexity	and	confusion	and,	quite	possibly,	will	have	unintended	consequences	including	the	
potential	to	make	finding	‘unacceptable	risk’	and	thereby	refusing	bail	more	difficult.	The	article	
then	considers	some	broader	issues	apparent	in	the	unfolding	of	these	events.	In	conclusion,	we	
consider	 the	question:	how	might	 this	 latest	chapter	 in	 the	history	of	bail	reform	have	played	
out	differently?	In	particular,	how	might	the	media	and	political	debate	around	the	 ‘notorious’	
cases	at	the	heart	of	the	media	storm	have	been	differently	inflected	and	contextualised?	How	
might	this	important	debate	have	been	infused	with	a	stronger	commitment	to	taking	seriously	
both	evidence	of	various	forms,	and	important	legal	and	democratic	principles?	
	
Background	
When	the	Coalition	came	to	power	in	NSW	in	2011,	then	Attorney	General	Greg	Smith	SC	took	
the	laudable	step	of	reforming	bail	laws.	As	a	former	prosecutor	with	detailed	inside	knowledge	
of	the	operation	of	the	criminal	justice	system,	Smith	was	particularly	concerned	with	the	way	
bail	refusal	impacted	on	young	people	(Gibson	2010)	and	on	8	June	2011	he	gave	the	NSW	LRC	
a	reference	to	‘develop	a	legislative	framework	that	provides	access	to	bail	in	appropriate	cases’	
(NSW	LRC	2012:	xv).	
	
The	need	for	bail	law	reform	had	arisen	out	of	the	unwieldy	complexity	of	the	Act’s	predecessor,	
the	Bail	Act	1978	(NSW).	This	Act	was	subject	to	constant	amendments	and	contained	a	series	of	
complex	 presumptions	 against	 bail	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 ch	 3)3	 which	 led	 to	 a	 soaring	 remand	
population	 in	 NSW	 (25	 per	 cent	 of	 all	 prisoners,	which	 is	 also	 the	 figure	 nationally)	 (Brown	
2013).4	The	new	Act	was	the	product	of	a	rigorous	law	reform	process.	The	NSW	LRC,	headed	by	
the	highly	respected	Judge	James	Wood	and	retired	Supreme	Court	Judge	Hal	Sperling,	engaged	
in	a	painstaking	review	over	nearly	12	months.	The	process	involved	circulation	of	Questions	for	
Discussion,5	 followed	 by	 extensive	 consultations	 with	 all	 interested	 parties,	 including	 NSW	
Police,	 and	 the	 circulation	 of	 a	 preliminary	 draft	 for	 comment.	 The	 final	 Report	 was	 then	
considered	by	 the	Attorney	General	and	his	Department	and	a	 response	was	published	(NSW	
Government	 2012),	 foreshadowing	 legislation	 which	 in	 part	 followed	 the	 NSW	 LRC	
recommendations.	The	new	Act	was	passed	with	the	support	of	all	major	parties	in	May	2013.	
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The	legislation	was	set	aside	for	12	months	to	enable	time	for	significant	training,	including	the	
Judicial	 Commission	of	NSW’s	bail	 scenarios6	 and	 26	 training	 sessions	 run	by	Legal	Aid	NSW	
across	that	state.7	
	
The	government’s	aim	was	simplicity	and	clarity:	
	
The	 Government	 anticipates	 that	 dispensing	 with	 the	 system	 of	 presumptions	
will	 not	 only	 simplify	 the	 bail	 decision	 making	 process,	 but	 will	 also	 result	 in	
fewer	 amendments	 to	 the	 legislation	 enabling	 it	 to	 remain	 simple	 and	 clear,	 as	
was	 intended	 when	 the	 original	 bail	 laws	 were	 codified	 in	 1978.	 (NSW	
Government	2012:	7)	
	
Four	 important	features	of	the	new	Act	designed	to	enhance	these	aims	are	highlighted	in	the	
next	section	because	each	came	to	have	greater	significance	as	events	unfolded.	These	are	the	
removal	 of	 the	 old	 complexity	 of	 presumptions;	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 purposes	 section;	
introduction	 of	 a	 two‐step	 unacceptable	 risk	model;	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 conditions	 can	 only	 be	
imposed	to	mitigate	unacceptable	risks.		
	
The	unacceptable	risk	model	
The	most	significant	feature	of	the	new	Act	is	that	it	does	away	with	the	complexity	of	the	old	
presumptions	that	had	plagued	the	Bail	Act	1978	(as	discussed	above).	While	the	new	Act	did	
not	adopt	 the	NSW	LRC’s	 recommendation	of	an	explicit	presumption	 in	 favour	of	bail	 for	 all	
offences,	it	provides	in	the	purposes	section,	that	a	bail	authority	in	making	a	bail	decision	is	to	
have	regard	to	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	an	accused’s	general	right	to	be	at	liberty	(s	
3(2)).	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 statutory	 construction,	 when	 construing	 a	 provision	 of	 the	 Act,	 a	
‘construction	 that	 would	 promote’	 those	 purposes	 is	 to	 be	 ‘preferred	 to	 a	 construction	 that	
would	not’:	see	Interpretation	Act	1987	(NSW)	s	33.	
	
The	 Act	 dramatically	 simplifies	 the	 old	 regime	 by	making	 central	 the	model	 of	 ‘unacceptable	
risk’	(s	17(1)).	This	model	requires	a	two‐stage	assessment.	First,	a	bail	authority	must	consider	
whether	an	accused	person	poses	an	unacceptable	risk	of:	failing	to	appear	at	any	proceedings	
for	the	offence;	committing	a	serious	offence;	endangering	the	safety	of	victims,	 individuals	or	
the	community;	or	interfering	with	witnesses	or	evidence	(s	17(2)(a)‐(d)).	In	deciding	whether	
such	an	unacceptable	risk	exists	the	bail	authority	is	to	have	regard	only	to	the	matters	set	out	in	
s	17(3)	(and	17(4)	where	relevant).	These	matters	include	(in	s	17(3)):	the	accused’s	person's	
background	(a);	 the	nature	and	seriousness	of	the	offence	(b);	 the	strength	of	the	prosecution	
case	(c);	whether	the	accused	person	has	a	history	of	violence	(d);	the	length	of	time	the	accused	
person	is	likely	to	spend	in	custody	if	bail	is	refused	(g);	and	any	special	vulnerability	or	needs	
of	the	accused	(j).	These	criteria	are	neither	novel	nor	new	and	are	broadly	similar	to	those	used	
in	s	32	of	the	old	Bail	Act	1978	regime.	If	no	such	‘unacceptable	risks’	exist,	bail	must	be	granted	
(s	18).		
	
If	 there	 are	unacceptable	 risks,	 the	 ‘second	 step’	or	 assessment	must	be	undertaken	with	 the	
bail	 authority	 considering	whether	 those	 risks	 can	be	mitigated	by	 imposing	conditions.	 Such	
conditions	 may	 be	 requirements	 as	 to:	 conduct	 (s	 25);	 security	 (s	 26);	 character	
acknowledgements	(s	27);	accommodation	(s	28);	pre‐release	(s	29);	and	enforcement	(s	30).	
Again,	such	conditions	are	not	new	but	what	is	very	different	is	that	conditions	can	now	only	be	
imposed	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 mitigating	 an	 unacceptable	 risk	 (s	 24(1)).	 Furthermore,	 such	
conditions	 must	 be	 ‘reasonable,	 proportionate	 to	 the	 offence	 for	 which	 bail	 is	 granted,	 and	
appropriate	to	the	unacceptable	risk	in	relation	to	which	they	are	imposed’	(s	24(3)).	This	was	
specifically	designed	to	target	problems	with	the	old	Bail	Act	1978	where	conditions	were	often	
imposed	 in	 a	 pro‐forma	 way	 leading	 to	 a	 proliferation	 of	 conditions	 not	 appropriate	 to	 the	
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specific	alleged	offence	or	offender,	 leading	 to	extensive	breaching	and	often	 the	arrest	of	 the	
offender	and	the	revocation	of	bail	(NSW	LRC	2012:	191‐245;	Brown	2013).		
	
If	conditions	can	mitigate	the	unacceptable	risk,	bail	 is	granted	(s	19);	only	 if	they	cannot	will	
bail	be	refused	(s	20(1)).	 (For	a	useful	discussion	of	 the	operation	of	 the	new	regime	see	also	
Sanders	2014.)	
	
The	triggers	for	review	
On	20	May	2014	the	Act	came	into	operation.	Within	weeks,	three	significant	decisions	to	grant	
(conditional)	bail	were	made	to	figures	who	evoked	popular	anxiety	and	anger:	on	16	June	2014	
to	Steven	Fesus,	accused	of	murdering	his	wife	17	years	ago	(R	v	Fesus	[2014]	NSWSC	770);	on	
16	 June	 to	 Hassan	 ‘Sam’	 Ibrahim,	 the	 former	 head	 of	 the	 Parramatta	 chapter	 of	 the	 Nomads	
outlaw	motorcycle	gang	charged	with	 selling	multiple	 illegal	 firearms	across	western	Sydney;	
and	 on	 19	 June	 2014	 to	 Mahmoud	 Hawi,	 former	 President	 of	 the	 Comancheros	 outlaw	
motorcycle	gang	and	charged	with	the	murder	of	Peter	Zervas	during	a	brawl	at	Sydney	Airport	
in	2009	(R	v	Hawi	[2014]	NSWSC	837).	It	was	a	‘perfect	storm’	and	the	tabloids	and	shock	jocks	
wasted	no	time	representing	these	bail	decisions	and	hence	the	new	Act	–	and,	powerfully,	by	
extension	the	Coalition	government	–	as	‘soft	on	crime’	(Quilter	2014a;	Brown	2014).	
		
While	the	Attorney	General	initially	defended	the	new	Act	(Clennell	2014),	after	only	five	weeks	
in	 operation	 the	 recently	 appointed	NSW	Premier	Mike	Baird8	 and	 his	 new	Attorney	General	
Brad	Hazzard	caved	in	to	the	media	pressure	and	on	27	June	2014	announced	a	review	of	the	
new	 Act	 by	 former	 Labor	 Party	 Attorney	 General	 Hatzistergos	 (Baird	 2014a).	 The	 Terms	 of	
Reference	were	broadly	framed	and	heavily	rhetorical	with	repeated	references	to	the	need	to	
protect	 the	 community	 (NSW	 Government	 2014).	 The	 Premier’s	 public	 statements	 also	
expressed	a	similar	preoccupation:	
	
…	 the	 Attorney	 General	 and	 I	 have	 become	 concerned	 that	 some	 recent	 bail	
decisions	do	not	reflect	the	government’s	intention	to	put	community	safety	front	
and	centre.	(Baird	2014a)		
	
Review	
On	5	August	2014	Hatzistergos’s	Review	of	 the	Bail	Act	2013	 (2014)	 (herein	after	 the	Review	
Report),	was	made	public.	The	Review	Report	makes	12	recommendations	(Hatzistergos	2014:	
11‐13).	Three	are	the	most	significant	and	the	most	damaging	to	the	new	Act’s	regime.	In	this	
section	 of	 the	 paper	 we	 offer	 an	 analysis	 of	 these	 three	 recommendations	 drawing	 on	 an	
examination	of	all	available	reported	decisions	(ten	in	total)	and	a	selection	of	unreported	cases.	
	
Presumption	of	innocence	
The	 first	 recommendation	 is	 to	omit	 the	purposes	 section	of	 the	Act	 (s	3)	which	 includes	 the	
need	‘to	have	regard	to	the	presumption	of	 innocence	and	the	general	right	to	be	at	liberty’	(s	
3(2)).	Instead,	the	Review	Report	recommends	this	be	relocated	to	a	‘preamble’	to	the	Act	which	
would	also	‘note	the	importance	of	bail	decisions	to	community	safety’	(Hatzistergos	2014:	[11];	
Rec	1).	The	stated	reason	for	this	recommendation,	is	‘the	role	played	by	section	3(2)	has	been	
problematic	or	at	least	confusing,	particularly	in	its	interaction	with	section	17(3)’	(Hatzistergos	
2014:	 [96]).	 The	 only	 evidence	 offered	 for	 this	 alleged	 confusion	 is	 a	 reference	 to	 one	
unreported	 decision	 and	 an	 even	 vaguer	 reference	 to	 ‘some	 Local	 Court	 determinations’	
(Hatzistergos	2014:	[96]).	Our	review	of	the	cases	demonstrates	there	is	no	confusion	over	the	
inclusion	of	the	‘presumption	of	innocence	and	the	general	right	to	liberty’	or	that	decisions	are	
giving	it	undue	weight:	indeed,	the	cases	often	make	no	mention	of	s	3(2)	or	where	they	do	it	is	
to	 recognise	 that	 this	 is	 not	 a	 new	 consideration	 (Fesus:	 [8];	 Lago:	 [13]).	 The	 cases	 focus	 on	
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determining	 ‘unacceptable	 risk’	 in	 s	 17	 (Lago:	 [13]‐[24];	 Alexandridis:	 [33]‐[42];	 Rokhzakyi:	
[25]‐[56]).	
	
We	have	not	found	any	case	where	the	role	of	the	presumption	of	innocence	amounts	to	being	
‘problematic	or	at	least	confusing’	as	asserted	in	the	Review	Report	at	[96].	We	have	located	one	
decision	where	the	interaction	between	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	s	17	is	emphasised,	R	
v	Morris	 (Unreported,	NSWSC,	McCallum	 J,	 20	May	2014,	 as	 cited	 in	Rodger	 2014).	 This	 case	
involved	 an	 Aboriginal	 woman	 who	 was	 charged	 with	 one	 larceny	 offence	 and	 had	 been	 in	
custody	for	two	months	at	 the	time	of	 the	bail	application.	McCallum	J	 found	that	Ms	Morris’s	
background	placed	her	 in	a	category	of	person	with	a	special	vulnerability	under	 the	Act	 in	 s	
17(3)(j)	for	she:	
	
…	 came	 from	 a	 background	 of	 severe	 deprivation	 including	 her	 subjection	 to	
violence,	 sexual	 abuse	 and	 movement	 between	 family	 and	 foster	 parents.	 In	
addition,	her	mother	was	murdered	when	she	was	a	 teenager	and	 she	suffered	
from	 depression	 together	 with	 a	 number	 of	 physical	 and	 mental	 conditions.	
(cited	in	Rodger	2014:	4)	
	
With	regard	to	the	relationship	between	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	special	vulnerability	
her	Honour	stated:	
	
In	determining	the	application,	I	am	required	to	have	regard	to	the	presumption	
of	 innocence	and	the	general	right	 to	be	at	 liberty:	s	3	of	the	Act.	The	weight	of	
that	consideration	is	reinforced	 in	the	present	case	by	relevant	evidence	of	the	
applicant's	 background	 which,	 in	 my	 assessment,	 plainly	 places	 her	 in	 the	
category	of	a	person	with	special	vulnerability:	cf	s	17(3)(j)	of	the	Act.	(cited	in	
Rodgers	2014:	4,	emphasis	in	original)	
	
McCallum	J	found	in	relation	to	any	unacceptable	risk	of	committing	a	serious	offence,	that	Ms	
Morris’s	 criminal	 history	 suggested	 that	 any	 offences	 committed	 would	 be	 relatively	 minor	
(such	as	shoplifting)	and	so	found	no	unacceptable	risk.		
	
We	consider	that	in	no	way	could	such	a	finding	suggest	that	s	3(2)	has	been	‘problematic	or	at	
least	 confusing,	 particularly	 in	 its	 interaction	with	 section	 17(3)’:	 on	 the	 contrary,	we	would	
argue	that	McCallum	J’s	assessment	was	entirely	sound.		
	
Unacceptable	risk	test	too	complex?	
The	 second	 significant	 recommendation	 is	 to	 collapse	 the	 two‐stage	 test	 for	 determining	
‘unacceptable	risk’	into	one	(Hatzistergos	2014:	[14];	Rec	2).	The	recommended	single‐step	test	
would	involve	determining	unacceptable	risk,	with	an	expanded	list	of	risk	factors	(Hatzistergos	
2014:	 [15];	 Recs	 3‐4),	 and	 by	 reference	 also	 to	 the	 bail	 conditions	 that	 might	 be	 imposed	
(Hatzistergos	2014:	 [14];	Rec	2).	Three	 reasons	underpin	 this	 recommendation:	 the	ability	 to	
impose	 conditions	 prior	 to	 finding	 ‘unacceptable	 risk’	 (Hatzistergos	 2014:	 [140]);	 alleged	
problems	in	the	application	of	the	unacceptable	risk	test;	and	the	community	finding	it	hard	‘to	
appreciate	 how	 an	 accused	 who	 was	 found	 to	 present	 an	 “unacceptable	 risk”	 can	 be	 safely	
released,	even	with	strict	bail	conditions’	(Hatzistergos	2014:	[14]).	
	
In	relation	to	the	first	reason,	one	case	indicates	some	disquiet	about	a	finding	of	unacceptable	
risk	as	a	pre‐requisite	 for	 imposing	conditions	 (Lago:	 [28]).	Aside	 from	 this	one	 instance,	our	
examination	of	the	cases	shows	no	evidence	of	a	problem	regarding	the	imposition	of	conditions	
and	more	importantly	no	confusion	over	the	application	of	the	two‐stage	unacceptable	risk	test.	
Rather	 the	 cases	 are	 developing	 a	 body	 of	 principles	 regarding	 ‘unacceptable	 risk’,	 albeit	 the	
repository	of	such	cases	is	in	its	infancy.	In	other	words,	the	cases	are	developing	principles	for	
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interpreting	the	term	‘unacceptable	risk’	as	it	 is	not	further	defined	in	the	Act	(Lago:	[5]).	The	
cases	do	have	recourse	to	the	decisions	in	Victoria	and	Queensland	(Hawi:	[15];	Lago:	[10]‐[12])	
(which	have	similar,	although	not	identical,	models9)	which	remind	us	that	bail	is	not	‘risk	free’	
(Hawi:	[41];	Alexandridis:	[34])	and	that	a	‘tenuous	suspicion’	or	‘fears	of	the	worst	possibility’	
(Lago:	[9])	if	an	offender	is	released	is	not	sufficient	to	constitute	‘unacceptable	risk’.	Some	risk	
will	always	be	present	given	the	‘unpredictability	of	individual	behaviour’	but	the	evaluation	is	
whether	the	risk	is	unacceptable	(Hawi:	[41]).	A	number	of	judges	have	quite	reasonably	made	
the	observation	that	bail	decisions	are	inevitably	an	exercise	in	prediction	and,	as	Justice	Hamill	
put	it,	‘Bail	authorities	do	not	have	a	crystal	ball.	They	are	not	soothsayers’	(Alexandridis:	[33]).	
This	is	not	the	product	of	the	2013	reforms,	it	has	always	been	thus.	Indeed,	making	predictive	
evaluations	 is	not	 foreign	 to	 the	courts,	 this	being	undertaken	 in	 the	context	of	 various	other	
statutory	regimes.10		
	
In	 deciding	whether	 there	 is	 an	unacceptable	 risk	 by	 reference	 to	 the	matters	 in	 s	 17(3),	 the	
cases	demonstrate	that	judges	are	logically	working	through	the	matters.	For	example,	in	Hawi,	
one	 of	 the	 cases	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 storm	 that	 triggered	 the	 review,	 Justice	 Harrison	
methodically	worked	 through	each	of	 the	 s	17(3)(a)‐(l)	 factors	 (Hawi:	 [24]‐[40]).11	By	way	of	
example,	we	note	in	relation	to	s	17(3)(a),	Justice	Harrison	stated:	
	
The	 Crown	 accepts	 that	 Mr	 Hawi's	 background	 and	 community	 ties	 are	 in	 his	
favour.	This	is	particularly	evident	from	material	tendered	on	his	behalf	without	
objection	in	the	form	of	unchallenged	affidavits	from	family	members	offering	to	
provide	 security	 by	way	 of	 surety	 for	 his	 release,	 subject	 to	 conditions,	 if	 that	
were	 to	 occur.	 It	 appears	 that	 Mr	 Hawi	 has	 a	 stable	 immediate	 and	 extended	
family	 in	the	area	of	Sydney	where	he	formerly	resided	and	where	his	wife	and	
children	continue	to	live.	He	has	identified	offers	of	employment	available	to	him	
within	this	familial	network	if	he	is	released.	Mr	Hawi's	criminal	history	is	limited	
and	 not	 particularly	 noteworthy.	 He	 has	 a	 conviction	 for	 assault	 occasioning	
actual	bodily	harm	when	aged	16	years	in	1996.	Relevantly	in	my	opinion,	he	also	
has	a	conviction	for	affray	arising	out	of	the	particular	events	on	22	March	2009.	
However,	no	other	aspect	of	his	criminal	history	reliably	informs	the	assessment	
of	an	unacceptable	risk	on	the	present	application.	(Hawi:	[25]‐[26])	
	
Our	examination	of	other	cases	indicates	that	the	following	s	17(3)	factors	have	also	featured	in	
the	judgments:	
	
 the	 accused	 person’s	 community	 ties	 (s	 17(3)(a))	 may	 indicate	 that	 there	 is	 no	
‘unacceptable	 risk’	 thereby	 justifying	 a	 grant	 of	 bail	 to	 a	 different	 State	 (R	 v	 Justice	
(Unreported,	NSWSC,	Schimdt	J,	28	May	2014,	cited	in	Rodger	2014:	6);	see	also	Hawi:	
[25]);	
 evaluations	 of	 the	 ‘nature	 and	 seriousness	 of	 the	 offence’	 (s	 17(3)(b)),	 especially	 if	 it	
involves	extreme	violence	such	as	murder,	may	alone	be	a	basis	for	finding	unacceptable	
risk	(Lago:	 [15]),	however,	 the	 ‘nature’	of	 the	offence	even	 if	 serious	may	arise	 from	a	
relatively	 unique	 set	 of	 circumstances	 that	 are	 not	 likely	 to	 be	 replicated,	 thereby	
reducing	risk	(Rokhzayi:	[30]);	
 emphasis	is	given	to	the	length	of	time	an	accused	person	will	spend	in	custody	before	
trial	if	bail	is	refused	(s	17(3)(g))	particularly	where	that	is	likely	to	be	more	than	a	year	
(Alexandridis:	[11]‐[12];	Lago:	[22];	Hawi:	[35]‐[36];	Rokhzayi:	[35]);	
 cases	deal	with	assessing	 the	 ‘special	vulnerability’	 (s	17(3)(j))	of	 the	applicant	which	
may	lead	to	competing	conclusions	(SK;	DK:	[14]):	the	vulnerability	giving	rise	to	a	need	
for	care	and	support	(hence	favouring	bail)	whereas	it	may	also	give	rise	to	concerns	for	
the	safety	of	the	community	(see	SK;	DK;	R	v	Pratley	(Unreported,	NSWSC,	Campbell	J,	4	
June	2014),	cited	in	Rodger	2014:	8).	
David	Brown,	Julia	Quilter:	Speaking	Too	Soon:	The	Sabotage	of	Bail	Reform	in	New	South	Wales	
	
IJCJ&SD					79	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2014	3(3)	
This	brief	 summary	 indicates	 that	 judicial	consideration	of	 the	Act	 is	very	much	 in	 its	 infancy	
with	further	time	needed	to	appropriately	develop	the	principles,	including	appellate	decisions.	
This	was	envisaged	by	Parliament,	expressly	providing	for	a	review	‘to	be	undertaken	as	soon	as	
possible	after	the	period	of	3	years’	(s	101(3),	emphasis	added)	–	not	in	less	than	two	months	as	
has	occurred	–	at	which	point	statistical	evidence	of	how	the	new	Act	is	operating	would	also	be	
available	from	the	NSW	Bureau	of	Crime	Statistics	and	Research	(Weatherburn	2014).	What	the	
cases	 do	 not	 demonstrate,	 though,	 is	 that	 there	 are	 significant	 problems	 or	 confusion	 with	
interpreting	the	‘unacceptable	risk’	test	as	the	Review	Report	stated.		
	
Serious	offences	and	show	cause	
The	 third	 and	most	problematic	 recommendation	 is	 the	 introduction	of	 categories	of	 ‘serious	
offences’	 (Hatzistergos	 2014:	 12;	 Rec	 6)	 for	 which	 an	 accused	 person	 would	 have	 to	 ‘show	
cause’	 as	 to	 why	 the	 accused’s	 detention	 is	 not	 justified	 (Rec	 5).	 The	 stated	 reason	 for	 this	
recommendation	 is	 to	 ‘provide	 a	useful	 level	 of	 reassurance	 for	 the	 community	 in	 relation	 to	
serious	 offenders	 whilst	 also	 providing	 a	 greater	 level	 of	 consistency’	 (Hatzistergos	 2014:	
[220]).	 The	 Review	 Report	 implies	 (at	 [188]‐[191])	 that	 this	 is	 required	 because	 while	 bail	
decisions	 in	 the	Supreme	Court	appropriately	weigh	 the	 relevant	s	17(3)	 factors	 (particularly	
‘nature	 and	 seriousness	 of	 the	 offence’	 (s	 17(3)(b))	 and	 ‘strength	 of	 the	 prosecution	 case’	 (s	
17(3)(c)),	the	majority	of	bail	decisions	are	made	by	police,	registrars	and	magistrates	who	may	
not	(Hatzistergos	2014:	[191]).		
	
In	 evaluating	 this	 recommendation,	 it	 is	 instructive	 to	 return	 to	 the	 three	 cases	 mentioned	
above	that	triggered	the	review	and	which	produced	the	supposed	level	of	community	anxiety	
around	 the	 new	 Act.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 recall	 that,	 when	 bail	 was	 granted	 in	 each	 of	 these	
matters,	 no	 judgments	 or	 reasons	 were	 made	 public.12	 This	 created	 a	 vacuum	 in	 which	 the	
media	dramatised	the	idea	that	the	Act	was	‘soft	on	crime’	and	the	community	was	potentially	at	
risk	 by	 having	 such	 accused	 persons	 on	 bail.	 Furthermore,	 with	 no	 published	 reasons,	 this	
meant	there	was	no	possible	‘counter‐argument’	to	explain	the	basis	for	the	decisions.	This	is	to	
be	 lamented,	 particularly	 as	 two	 of	 the	 judgments	 were	 later	 made	 available	 which	 provide	
detailed	reasons	as	to	why	conditional	bail	was	granted.13	Thus,	the	decision	in	Fesus	indicates	
that	 new	 forensic	 evidence	 became	 available	 at	 the	 bail	 application	 that	 impacted	 on	 the	
strength	of	the	prosecution	case	(s	17(3)(c))	and	this	factor,	taken	together	with	the	length	of	
time	 since	 offending	 (17	 years),	 led	 Adams	 J	 to	 grant	 conditional	 bail.	 Justice	 Harrison’s	
judgment	 in	Hawi	 sets	 out	 (as	 noted	 above)	 the	 reasoned	 basis	 for	 granting	 conditional	 bail.	
Hawi’s	murder	conviction	appeal	had	also	been	upheld	by	 the	NSW	Court	of	Criminal	Appeal,	
with	 the	 Chief	 Justice	 favouring	 a	 complete	 acquittal	 and	 the	 two	majority	 judges	 ordering	 a	
retrial.14	Ultimately,	Hawi	pleaded	guilty	 to	 the	manslaughter	of	Zervas	on	5	September	2014	
and	bail	was	not	 opposed	by	 the	Crown	 (Bibby	2014a),	 raising	 serious	questions	about	what	
this	whole	scenario	was	actually	about.	In	the	final	matter	(Ibrahim),	no	first	instance	or	appeal	
judgment	has	been	made	available	but	 the	DPP	 successfully	 appealed	 the	original	 decision	 to	
grant	bail	and	on	27	June	2014	bail	was	revoked	by	the	Supreme	Court.	
	
At	the	heart	of	media	reporting	of	these	cases	lies	confusion	over	the	purpose	of	bail	which	is	
not	about	whether	or	not	an	accused	person	 is	guilty	of	an	offence.	 In	recent	media	 coverage	
and	in	the	way	the	Government	has	handled	the	situation,	bail	has	come	to	symbolise	‘judgment’	
and	serve	as	a	proxy	for	guilt	and	punishment.	Denying	bail	–	putting	a	person	in	jail	before	trial	
–	has	become	a	way	of	expressing	condemnation	of	the	behaviour	in	which	a	person	is	alleged	to	
have	engaged	(Quilter	2014a).	
	
The	Government	response	and	the	Bail	Amendment	Act	2014	
The	same	day	as	the	Review	Report	was	made	public	(5	August	2014),	the	Premier	stated	in	a	
Media	Release	 that	 the	Act	would	be	 amended	 to	 adopt	 each	 of	 the	 recommendations	 (Baird	
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2014b).	Just	over	one	week	later,	on	13	August	2014,	the	Bail	Amendment	Bill	2014	was	read	
for	a	second	time.	In	the	Second	Reading	speech,	the	Attorney	General	expressly	noted	that	the	
Bill	 accepts	 all	 of	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	 Review	 Report	 as	 they	 ‘…	 are	 common‐sense	
changes’	(Hazzard	2014:	9).	The	Second	Reading	speech	concludes:	
	
The	 Government	 acknowledges	 that	 the	 NSW	 Police	 Force,	 courts	 and	 legal	
practitioners	will	need	some	time	to	digest	these	changes.	Education	and	training	
will	be	required,	along	with	changes	 to	various	 information	management	systems	
and	bail	forms.	The	Government	recognises,	however,	that	the	changes	proposed	
in	this	bill	must	be	 implemented	swiftly	to	ensure	that	the	Bail	Act	 is	striking	the	
right	balance	in	protecting	the	community	and	the	integrity	of	the	justice	system.	I	
commend	the	bill	to	the	House.	(Hazzard	2014:11;	emphasis	added)	
	
While	the	Government’s	Amendment	Bill	suggests	an	urgent	need	to	ensure	the	Act	is	striking	
the	 right	balance,	 the	 evidence	 (as	discussed	 above)	 suggests	 otherwise.	 But	 the	Government	
may	get	more	 than	 it	bargained	 for	with	some	unintended	effects	of	 the	amending	provisions	
discussed	below.		
	
The	 Amendment	 Bill	 was	 passed	 by	 Parliament	 on	 17	 September	 2014	 and,	 at	 the	 time	 of	
publication	of	this	article,	was	yet	to	commence	operation.	There	are	three	main	points	to	make	
about	the	Bail	Amendment	Act	2014.	
	
First,	the	reference	to	the	presumption	of	innocence	which	had	been	in	the	purposes	section	of	
the	Act	has	been	relocated	to	the	Preamble	along	with	statements	regarding:	the	need	to	ensure	
the	safety	of	victims,	individuals	and	the	community	(a);	and	need	to	ensure	the	integrity	of	the	
justice	system	(b).	Resort	 to	a	preamble	 is	old	 fashioned	and	has	generally	been	discontinued	
(Pearce	 &	 Geddes	 2011:	 [1.32]).	 The	 clear	 purpose	 is	 to	 reduce	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 bail	
authority	 having	 regard	 to	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 –	 a	 regard	 that	 has	 not	 featured	
strongly	in	the	cases	analysed	–	with	the	assumption	that	a	preamble	is	not	usually	construed	as	
part	 of	 the	 Act.15	 If	 this	 construction	 is	 upheld	 by	 the	 courts,	 a	 cornerstone	 of	 our	 criminal	
justice	system	–	 the	presumption	of	 innocence	–	 is	 significantly	downgraded.	 Ironically,	given	
the	rhetoric	around	the	asserted	need	for	the	2014	amendments,	the	legislation’s	expression	of	
principles	 regarding	 community	 safety	 has	 also	 been	 consigned	 to	 the	 relatively	 innocuous	
location	of	the	preamble.		
	
Secondly,	 s	17	 introduces	a	new	concept	of	 ‘bail	 concern’	not	otherwise	known	 to	bail	 law	 in	
NSW	 or	 any	 other	 Australian	 jurisdiction,	 and	 certainly	 not	 in	 the	 equivalent	
Victorian/Queensland	unacceptable	risk	models.	Thus,	 the	amending	provisions	require	a	bail	
authority	to	assess	any	‘bail	concerns’	before	making	a	bail	decision	(s	17(1)).	A	‘bail	concern’	is	
one	 that	relates	 to	 the	 former	 factors	used	 to	assess	 ‘unacceptable	risks’	 in	s	17(2)	(failing	 to	
appear;	commit	a	serious	offence;	endanger	safety	of	victims,	individuals	or	the	community;	or	
interfere	 with	 witnesses).	 In	 assessing	 the	 ‘bail	 concern’	 the	 bail	 authority	 must	 take	 into	
account	 only	 the	 matters	 in	 s	 18,	 which	 is	 comprised	 of	 an	 expanded	 list16	 of	 the	 matters	
previously	 used	 to	 assess	 unacceptable	 risk	 in	 s	 17(3).	 Importantly,	 these	 factors	 now	 also	
include	any	bail	 conditions	 that	 could	 reasonably	be	 imposed	 to	address	any	bail	 concerns	 (s	
18(1)(p))	 whereas	 previously	 such	 conditions	 could	 only	 be	 imposed	 to	 mitigate	 an	
‘unacceptable	 risk’.	 The	 clear	 intent	 is	 to	 allow	 bail	 conditions	 to	 be	 imposed	 at	 the	 lower	
threshold	of	a	‘bail	concern’:	that	is,	even	if	no	‘unacceptable	risk’	is	identified.	This	is	in	direct	
conflict	with	 the	NSW	 LRC	Report	 on	Bail	 (discussed	 above)	which	 attempted	 to	 restrict	 the	
proliferation	of	pro‐forma	bail	conditions	and	conduct	requirements	(see	NSW	LRC	2012:	191‐
245;	Brown	2014)	by	making	it	a	two‐step	process	so	that	conditions	only	came	into	play	where	
the	person	would	otherwise	be	detained,	or	as	provided	in	the	legislation,	where	there	had	been	
an	unacceptable	risk	finding.	
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While	this	may	be	the	intended	effect,	introducing	a	concept	not	otherwise	known	to	Australian	
bail	 laws	 may	 also	 have	 unintended	 consequences.	 In	 particular,	 the	 ‘unacceptable	 risk’	
assessment	in	s	19	still	requires	a	‘second	step’	before	bail	can	be	refused	and	so	the	two	steps	
are	not	fully	collapsed.	More	importantly,	the	concept	of	‘unacceptable	risk’	seems	to	become	a	
‘free	floating’	one	attached	now	only	to	the	factors	in	s	19(2)(a)‐(d)	(failing	to	appear;	commit	a	
serious	offence;	endanger	the	safety	of	victims,	individuals	or	the	community;	or	interfere	with	
witnesses)	 but	 not	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 s	 18	 matters.17	 While	 s	 19(1)	 indicates	 that	 a	 bail	
authority	is	to	refuse	bail	if	satisfied,	‘on	the	basis	of	an	assessment	of	bail	concerns	under	this	
Division,	 that	 there	 is	an	unacceptable	risk’,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	marry	s	19(1)	with	s	19(2).	Thus,	
what	 is	 it	 about	 the	 ‘assessment	of	 bail	 concerns	under	 this	Division’	 that	 can	 raise	 it	 from	a	
mere	‘bail	concern’	to	an	‘unacceptable	risk’	when	a	‘concern’	is	clearly	a	lower	threshold	which	
may	not	even	amount	to	a	‘risk’	let	alone	an	‘unacceptable’	one.	Ironically,	this	could	also	have	
the	other	unintended	consequence	of	making	bail	refusal	more	difficult	since	it	is	now	unclear	
how	 the	 bail	 authority	 moves	 from	 an	 assessment	 of	 ‘bail	 concerns’	 in	 s	 18	 to	 the	 higher	
threshold	 of	 ‘unacceptable	 risk’:	 that	 is,	 a	 bail	 concern	 is	 not	 even	 a	 ‘risk’	 let	 alone	 an	
‘unacceptable’	one.	
	
If	the	Government	was	genuinely	concerned	that	the	two‐step	unacceptable	risk	regime	in	the	
original	2013	Act	was	causing	confusion,	it	is	surprising	that	they	have	now	introduced	what	is	
in	effect	another	layer	of	assessment	and	prediction,	using	the	language	of	‘bail	concern’.		
	
Finally,	an	additional	layer	of	complexity	has	been	added	by	the	‘show	cause’	provision	in	s	16A,	
which	returns	us	squarely	to	the	old	territory	of	the	complexities	of	presumptions	against	bail	in	
the	 former	Bail	Act	1978	 (discussed	above).	While	 the	Review	Report	argues	 for	 a	distinction	
between	a	 show	cause	 test	 to	offence‐based	 ‘presumptions’	 at	 [222],	 the	distinction	 is	poorly	
explained	and	appears	to	be	one	of	semantics:		
	
The	 show	cause	 test	 is	different	 to	 the	previous	offence‐based	presumptions	 in	
the	 1978	 Act.	 Offence‐based	 presumptions	 indicate	 the	 bail	 outcome	 that	 an	
accused	is	expected	to	receive.	Where	an	accused	cannot	rebut	the	presumption,	
the	presumption	has	operative	force.	This	does	not	work	within	an	unacceptable	
risk	model.	 The	 show	 cause	 requirement	 is	 part	 of	 a	 process	 to	 reach	 the	 end	
decision	which	includes	the	risk	assessment.	(At	[222],	emphasis	in	original)	
	
Indeed,	it	will	be	difficult	to	explain	to	a	person	accused	of	a	‘show	cause’	offence	how	this	does	
not	 determine	 the	 bail	 outcome	 given	 the	 restrictive	 reasons	 for	 showing	 cause	 (discussed	
below).18	Furthermore,	as	the	NSW	LRC	Report	made	clear:	
	
…	the	scheme	of	presumptions,	exceptions,	and	exceptional	circumstances	…	is	an	
unwarranted	 imposition	 on	 the	 discretion	 of	 police	 and	 the	 courts.	 …	 It	 is	
voluminous,	unwieldy,	hugely	complex	and	involves	too	blunt	an	approach.	The	
results	are	frequently	anomalous	and	unjust.	(NSW	LRC	2012:	123)	
	
Moreover	an	accused’s	inclusion	within	a	particular	‘category’	of	serious	offence	tells	us	next	to	
nothing	about	his/her	risk	factors	in	relation	to:	non‐appearance;	committing	a	serious	offence	
whilst	on	bail;	interfering	with	evidence;	or	endangering	the	safety	of	victims	or	the	community.	
The	 show	 cause	 test,	 is	 further	 problematic	 because,	while	 it	 clarifies	 that	 if	 a	 person	 shows	
cause	 the	 unacceptable	 risk	 test	 must	 still	 be	 applied	 prior	 to	 bail	 being	 granted	 (the	
Queensland/Victorian	 provisions	 were	 equivocal19),	 it	 may	 complicate	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
‘unacceptable	 risk’	 test	 further.	 Section	 19(3)	 provides	 that	 where	 a	 person	 has	 shown	 that	
detention	is	not	justified	this	‘is	not	relevant	to	the	determination	of	whether	or	not	there	is	an	
unacceptable	 risk’.	 The	 Queensland	 and	 Victorian	 cases	 suggest	 that	 an	 accused	 may	 show	
cause,	 for	 instance,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 strength/weakness	 of	 the	 prosecution	 case,	 excessive	
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preventable	delays	and	an	accused’s	special	medical	condition.20	In	 the	event	that	 the	accused	
does	‘show	cause’	and	the	bail	authority	turns	to	the	unacceptable	risk	assessment,	does	s	19(3)	
mean	 that	 the	 factors	 taken	 into	 account	 for	 showing	 cause	 cannot	 be	 re‐assessed	 for	 the	
making	 of	 a	 bail	 decision	 of	 ‘unacceptable	 risk’?	If	 that	 is	 so,	 this	 would	 be	 particularly	
problematic	 given	 that,	when	 assessing	 the	 factors	 in	 s	 18,	 specific	 reference	 to	matters	 that	
may	be	used	to	‘show	cause’	are	included	(for	example	s	18(1)(c)	(strength	of	the	prosecution	
case),	(h)	the	length	of	time	the	accused	person	is	likely	to	spend	in	custody	if	bail	is	refused	and	
(k)	(special	vulnerability/needs)).21	
	
While	the	Government	has	claimed	that	the	changes	are	‘common	sense’,	in	its	determination	to	
look	 ‘tougher’	 on	 crime	 and	 to	 give	 the	 electorate	 the	 impression	 that	 more	 people	 will	 be	
denied	bail,	they	have	rashly	introduced	complicated	and	unnecessary	changes	to	a	regime	that	
had	only	just	begun	to	become	familiar	to	police,	lawyers,	magistrates	and	judges	after	a	twelve	
month	familiarisation	and	training	period.	It	is	unclear	what	status	the	emerging	body	of	legal	
principles	 under	 the	Act	 discussed	 in	 this	 article	will	 now	have.	 Indeed,	will	magistrates	 and	
judges	 yet	 again	 need	 to	 start	 from	 scratch?	 And	 clearly,	 the	 Attorney	 General	 has	 already	
indicated	(see	second	reading	speech	cited	above)	that	further	training	and	education	and	time‐
lag	may	well	be	needed	to	accommodate	these	amendments.	What	a	mess!	
	
Broader	issues	in	the	bail	reform	reversal		
What	 are	 we	 to	 make	 more	 generally	 of	 the	 sudden	 media‐driven	 reversal	 of	 bail	 reform	
outlined	above?	Do	we	just	add	it	to	the	list	as	yet	another	example	of	the	irrationality	of	public	
policy	making?	We	suggest	there	are	some	wider	features	that	go	beyond	the	specific	instance	
that	 are	 worth	 highlighting	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 outbreak	 of	 regressive	 criminal	 justice	
legislation	in	a	range	of	jurisdictions,	not	least	in	Queensland,	Victoria	and	NSW.	These	features	
include:	the	denigration	of	judicial	expertise	and	lack	of	concern	with	evidence	and	process;	the	
power	of	 the	 ‘shock	 jocks’,	 tabloids	and	police;	 and	political	 failure	 to	understand	and	defend	
fundamental	 legal	 principles	 that	 benefit	 us	 all	 and	 are	 central	 to	 the	 maintenance	 of	 a	
democratic	society	and	the	rule	of	law	(Brown	2014).	
	
The	denigration	of	judicial	expertise	and	lack	of	concern	with	evidence	and	process	
A	common	feature	is	the	denigration	of	judicial	expertise	and	a	lack	of	concern	with	evidence.	In	
contrast	 to	 the	 NSW	 LRC	 Report	 and	 process,	 the	 Review	 Report	 involved	 little	 or	 no	 new	
research.	Its	arguments	do	not	arise	out	of	empirical	analysis	nor,	as	analysed	above,	was	there	
evidence,	after	one	month’s	operation,	of	any	judicial	concern	over	the	interpretation	of	the	Act.	
What	 is	 the	 point	 in	 investing	 time	 and	 expense	 in	 the	 extensive	 consultative	 inquiries	 if	 the	
results,	 having	been	 scrutinised	 by	 the	Attorney	General’s	Department,	 reduced	 to	 legislation	
and	subjected	to	one	year’s	training	for	all	who	will	administer	it,	can	be	overturned	by	a	short	
term	political	process	before	the	new	Act	has	been	in	operation	 long	enough	to	be	evaluated?	
What	message	does	this	send	about	political	regard	for	judicial	expertise?	
	
The	events	also	highlight	impatience	with	and	lack	of	faith	in	legal	processes	and	the	ability	of	
the	system	to	correct	error.	The	first	recourse	in	response	to	arguments	that	a	decision	is	wrong	
is	to	take	it	on	appeal,	not	change	the	law.	In	recent	years	a	feature	of	attacks	on	the	judiciary	as	
‘out	 of	 touch’	 and	 ‘not	 reflecting	 community	 values’	 has	 been	 lack	 of	 preparedness	 to	 take	
contested	 cases	 on	 appeal	 or,	where	 they	 are	 taken	 on	 appeal,	 to	wait	 for	 the	 results	 before	
changing	the	law.	A	clear	example	was	the	introduction	of	the	NSW	‘one	punch’	law	in	response	
to	the	media	and	public	outcry	over	the	sentence	handed	down	in	2013	to	Kieran	Loveridge	for	
the	manslaughter	 of	 Thomas	 Kelly	 (Quilter	 2014b),	 even	 though	 the	 DPP	 had	 announced	 an	
intention	to	appeal	the	sentence.	Legislation	to	introduce	a	new	‘assault	causing	death’	offence	
was	rushed	through	Parliament	in	January	2014	(Quilter	2014b).	In	May	2014	the	NSW	Court	of	
Criminal	Appeal	handed	down	its	decision	on	the	DPP’s	appeal	against	sentence,	articulating	the	
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relevant	sentencing	principles	and	finding	manifest	inadequacy	in	the	sentence	which	was,	as	a	
result,	significantly	increased	(Loveridge	[2014]	NSWCCA	120).	In	addition,	the	opportunity	for	
a	 more	 nuanced	 guideline	 judgment	 was	 lost	 as	 the	 DPP	 had	 to	 withdraw	 his	 guideline	
judgment	application	in	the	Loveridge	appeal	in	light	of	the	introduction	of	the	new	‘one	punch’	
law.		
	
It	 is	easier	 for	 the	Police	Association	of	NSW	(the	NSW	police	union)	to	complain	 to	the	Daily	
Telegraph	 or	 selected	 shock	 jocks	 and	 initiate	 a	media	 campaign	 than	 request	 the	DPP	 to	 go	
through	 the	normal	 criminal	 justice	processes.	During	his	 campaign	against	 the	bail	 laws	Ray	
Hadley,	a	high	rating	radio	‘shock	jock’,	‘claimed	on	his	2GB	radio	program	to	have	received	400	
emails	 from	 serving	 police	 officers	 complaining	 about	 magistrates	 decisions’	 (Olding	 2014).	
Such	recourse	to	the	media	often	produces	quicker	results	than	reliance	on	legal	processes,	as	
politicians,	 unprepared	 to	 argue	 for	 principles	 or	 await	 established	 legal	 processes,	 rush	 to	
change	laws	in	response	to	media	criticism.	In	this	way	the	level	of	public	trust	in	the	judiciary	
and	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 is	 constantly	 eroded,	 to	 the	 long‐term	 detriment	 of	 legal	
integrity	 (Hindess	 and	 Sawyer	 2004).22	 This	 process	 feeds	 into	 an	 increasingly	 uncivil	 public	
discourse.	Instant	experts	abound.	People	who	would	not	think	of	looking	over	the	shoulder	of,	
say,	 their	 electrician,	 plumber	 or	 mechanic,	 seem	 to	 think	 judicial	 decisions	 can	 be	 second	
guessed	by	anyone,	irrespective	of	their	(lack	of)	knowledge	of	all	the	specific	facts	or	evidence	
(Ryan	2005;	Loader	2006;	Garland	2001).23		
	
Another	 feature	of	 these	events	 is	 the	growing	practice	of	using	 former	politicians	to	produce	
quick	 ‘reviews’	 of	 complex	 legislation,	 often	 in	 preference	 to	 considered	 judicial	 and	 other	
extensive	reports	(Tink	and	Wheelan	2013).24	Such	reviews	lack	the	element	of	independence,	
the	depth	of	research	and	reliance	on	evidence,	and	the	time	for	widespread	consultation	among	
interested	parties,	that	are	characteristic	of	law	reform	and	other	inquiries.	They	are	‘in‐house’	
political	exercises	designed	to	produce	a	way	 for	politicians	 to	go	through	the	appearances	of	
consultation	 while	 securing	 the	 quick	 results	 they	 want	 so	 as	 to	 alleviate	 media	 and	 public	
pressure	(Sentas	and	Cowdery	2013).	
	
As	the	former	Attorney	General	who	presided	over	more	‘punitive’	amendments	(Steel	2009)	to	
the	 reformist	 Bail	 Act	 1978	 than	 any	 other,	 turning	 bail	 from	 a	 release	 mechanism	 that	
respected	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	the	right	to	liberty	into	a	mechanism	for	pre‐trial	
punishment,	Hatzistergos	was	possibly	the	most	inappropriate	person	imaginable	to	carry	out	
the	review.	It	was	precisely	the	process	of	constant	undermining	of	the	presumption	in	favour	of	
bail	which	he	championed,	that	led	to	the	complexity	and	incoherence	of	the	1978	Act	and	to	the	
reference	 to	 the	NSW	LRC	to	remedy	 it.	Hatzistergos’s	hard‐line	position	could	not	have	been	
clearer	than	when	he	introduced	the	Bail	Amendment	Bill	2007,	boasting	that	‘New	South	Wales	
now	has	the	toughest	bail	laws	in	Australia’.	He	noted	that:		
	
…	part	of	those	changes	includes	removing	the	presumption	in	favour	of	bail	for	a	
large	 number	 of	 crimes	 and	 introducing	 presumptions	 against	 bail	 for	 crimes	
including	drug	importation,	firearm	offences,	repeat	property	offences,	and	riots,	
and	 an	 even	 more	 demanding	 exceptional	 circumstances	 test	 for	 murder	 and	
serious	personal	violence,	including	sexual	assault.	
	
Those	types	of	offenders	now	have	a	much	tougher	time	being	granted	bail	under	
our	rigorous	system.	These	extensive	changes	have	delivered	results.	There	is	no	
doubt	 that	 the	 inmate	 population,	 particularly	 those	 on	 remand,	 has	 risen	
considerably	as	a	result	of	the	changes.	 In	fact	the	number	of	remand	prisoners	
has	increased	by	20	per	cent	in	the	last	three	years	alone	and	new	jails	are	being	
opened	to	accommodate	the	increase.	(Hatzistergos	2007,	emphasis	added)	
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In	 short,	 access	 to	bail	 should	be	heavily	 restricted	 for	 ‘those	 types	of	offenders’,	 referring	 to	
accused	people	who	have	not	yet	had	their	guilt	determined	by	a	court,	a	classic	conflation	of	
accusation	and	guilt	which	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	media	and	political	responses	outlined	above.	
A	similar	nonchalance	towards	the	presumption	of	innocence	was	shown	more	recently	by	NSW	
Attorney	 General	 Brad	Hazzard	 appointed	 to	 this	 position	 in	 April	 2014.	 Speaking	 about	 the	
shifting	 of	 the	 onus	 to	 defendants	 to	 prove	 that	 they	 should	 be	 granted	 bail	 under	 the	
amendments,	he	stated:	‘I	have	no	doubt	that	needed	to	be	changed,	and	they	[defendants]	now	
have	to	convince	the	court	on	behalf	of	the	community	they	should	be	allowed	out,	and	I	don’t	
really	 see	 that	 as	a	 big	 deal.’	 (Huntsdale	 2014,	 emphasis	 added)	 If	 Attorneys	 General	 cannot	
respect	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	the	role	of	bail	in	protecting	the	value	of	liberty,	how	
are	we	to	expect	shock	jocks	and	tabloid	journalists	to	do	so?	And	is	an	explosion	in	the	remand	
population	 and	 the	 hugely	 expensive	 building	 of	 new	 prisons	 seriously	 suggested	 to	 be	 the	
primary	indicator	of	successful	criminal	justice	policy,	especially	in	relation	to	the	unconvicted?		
	
Finally,	the	complete	lack	of	concern	with	evidence	for	the	change	is	in	contrast	to	the	constant	
political	 parroting	 of	 the	 need	 for	 ‘evidence	 driven	 policy’.	 Here	 a	 reform	 based	 on	 years	 of	
intensive	and	expert	consideration	was	sabotaged	before	it	had	had	time	to	operate	long	enough	
to	be	evaluated.	Why	not	wait	to	see	how	it	was	working?	The	answer	can	only	be	that	the	main	
concern	was	not	with	the	evidence,	the	reality,	but	with	the	political	imperative	of	appearing	to	
placate	the	shock	jocks	and	the	Police	Association	of	NSW	in	order	to	diminish	media	criticism	
of	the	government.	
	
The	power	of	the	shock	jocks,	tabloids	and	Police	Association	
A	further	feature	of	the	bail	reform	reversal	is	the	power	of	the	shock	jocks	(Mickler	2004)	and	
the	tabloids	(Scalmer	and	Goot	2004),	in	this	case	Ray	Hadley	in	particular.	Hadley’s	animosity	
towards	former	Attorney	General	Smith	was	played	out	in	the	debate	prior	to	the	release	of	the	
NSW	LRC	Report	 as	 part	 of	 a	 pre‐emptive	 attack	 on	 the	Report,	 commenced	 even	 before	 the	
Commission’s	final	recommendations	had	been	settled.	On	one	front	page	of	the	Daily	Telegraph	
Greg	Smith	was	pictured	as	turning	from	Rambo	to	a	marshmallow,	accompanied	by	a	banner	
headline	 ‘How	DPP	Greg	 Smith	went	 from	Rambo	 to	 cream	puff	with	 stance	 of	 sentencing	 in	
NSW’	(Clennell	2012).	This	undermining	of	Greg	Smith	for	not	being	tough	enough	on	law	and	
order	was	ultimately	successful	with	Smith	being	removed	from	the	portfolio.		
	
Smith’s	former	media	advisor,	legal	journalist	Michael	Pelly,	has	noted	that	Smith’s	attempts	to	
reform	bail	and	sentencing	and	bring	the	prison	population	down	was	initially	popular	within	
the	 government,	 particularly	 on	 financial	 grounds,	 until	 pressure	 was	 applied.	 According	 to	
Pelly,	‘the	pressure	came	largely	from	one	source:	2GB	[radio]	Ray	Hadley’:	
	
Ray	 has	 very	 solid	 links	 to	 the	 police	 and	 has	 a	 particular	 view	 about	 law	 and	
order	policy,	and	his	voice	is	extremely	influential.	
Each	parliamentary	office	…	has	a	radio	selection.	And	I	can	assure	you	that	from	
9	o’clock	to	12	o’clock,	I’d	say	80	per	cent	of	parliamentarians	had	Ray	Hadley	on	
the	radio	and	had	Ray	Hadley	telling	them	for	a	good	four	months	that	Greg	Smith	
was	 soft	 on	 crime,	 was	 a	 raving	 lunatic,	 that	 Barry	 O’Farrell	 should	 sack	 him.	
(Quoted	in	Arnold	2014)	
	
At	the	time	Smith	was	removed,	the	Attorney	General’s	Department	was	subsumed	into	a	newly	
named	 Police	 and	 Justice	 Department.	 The	 result	 of	 this	 was	 that,	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 NSW	
history,	the	Attorney	General	was	junior	in	status	to	the	Police	Minister.	In	Premier	Baird’s	April	
2014	ministerial	appointments,	this	was	Mike	Gallacher,	who	was	subsequently	forced	to	resign	
as	 Police	Minister	 over	 corruption	 allegations	 raised	 at	 the	 Independent	 Commission	Against	
Corruption	(Whitbourn	et	al.	2014).	The	Attorney	General	has,	by	constitutional	convention,	a	
special	role	as	first	law	officer:	broadly	put,	to	protect	the	integrity	of	legal	processes	(Heraghty	
David	Brown,	Julia	Quilter:	Speaking	Too	Soon:	The	Sabotage	of	Bail	Reform	in	New	South	Wales	
	
IJCJ&SD					85	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2014	3(3)	
2002).	Following	criticism,	the	Baird‐appointed	Attorney	General,	Brad	Hazzard,	was	upgraded	
by	being	named	head	of	the	Police	and	Justice	Department;	shortly	thereafter	(late	June	2014)	
the	Department’s	name	was	re‐changed	for	a	second	time	within	two	months	to	‘Department	of	
Justice’	(Needham	2014).	
	
The	 initial	downgrading	of	 the	position	of	 the	Attorney	General	vis‐a‐vis	 the	Police	Minister	 is	
another	 illustration	 of	 the	 power	 and	 influence	 wielded	 by	 the	 Police	 Association	 of	 NSW.	
Gallacher	was	a	former	President	of	this	organisation.	Increasingly,	NSW	government	responses	
to	significant	criminal	justice	issues	have	been	driven	by	the	Police	Minister,	and	indirectly	the	
Police	 Association,	 rather	 than	 the	 Attorney	 General.	 This	 came	 to	 a	 head	 in	 outbursts	 from	
Barry	O’Farrell	who	claimed	that	the	judiciary	were	‘out	of	touch’	after	one	bail	decision	(Davies	
and	Patty	2012)	and	again	over	 the	Thomas	Kelly	 ‘one	punch’	 case	where	he	 called	 for	more	
judges	and	magistrates	 to	be	 selected	 from	 the	police	because	 the	police	were	more	 in	 touch	
with	 community	 values.	 The	 Police	 Association	 sees	 its	 role	 not	 simply	 as	 protecting	 the	
industrial	 interests	 of	 its	 members	 but	 also	 in	 securing	 the	 widest	 possible	 police	 powers,	
irrespective	 of	 whether	 that	 is	 desirable	 in	 the	 broader	 public	 interest	 of	 maintaining	
democratic	traditions	of	liberties	and	rights	(Sentas	and	Cowdery	2013).		
	
This	 is	 not	 a	new	development.	Mark	Finnane	has	 traced	 the	history	of	 police	union	 political	
power	back	to	the	1920s,	noting	that	‘the	annual	conferences	of	police	unions	in	Australia	have	
been	 a	 standing	 item	 in	 the	 diaries	 of	 ministers	 responsible	 for	 police,	 their	 shadows	 in	
opposition,	 and	occasionally	even	a	premier’	 (Finnane	2000:	5).	Notable	 examples	of	political	
interventions	occurred	in	NSW	by	way	of	selective	non‐enforcement	of	public	order	offences	as	
part	 of	 a	 campaign	 against	 the	 repeal	 of	 the	 Summary	 Offences	 Act	 1970	 (NSW)	 (Egger	 and	
Findlay	1988),	 in	Queensland	 in	the	wake	of	 the	Fitzgerald	Inquiry	(1989)	and	 in	the	role	 the	
Police	 Association	 of	 Victoria	 played	 in	 bringing	 down	 three	 Police	 Commissioners:	 Comrie,	
Nixon	 and	Overland	 (Bachelard	 and	Munro	 2011).	 Finnane	 (2000:	 17)	 concluded	 that	 ‘police	
unions	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 had	 become	major	 players	 in	 the	 organisation	 of	
criminal	 justice	in	Australia.’	What	is	perhaps	new	is	his	suggestion	that	 ‘the	media	became	at	
some	point	a	captive	of	police	union	viewpoints	–	at	what	point	and	to	what	degree	would	await	
further	research’	(Finnane	2000:	16).	
	
The	political	failure	to	defend	rule	of	law	principles	
Another	 feature	of	the	events	 is	the	 fickleness	of	politicians	and	their	 inability	 to	stand	up	for	
principles.	 Amongst	 various	 rule	 of	 law	 principles	 are	 that	 citizens	 should	 have	 a	 right	 to	
personal	 liberty,	 enjoy	 a	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 and	 not	 suffer	 punishment	 without	
conviction	 after	 due	 process	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 ch	 2).	 Detention	 before	 trial	 offends	 these	
principles	and	so	 it	 should	be	strictly	 limited.	The	 laws	 relating	 to	bail	 should	ensure	 this,	by	
providing	that	bail	can	only	be	denied	if	it	is	likely	that	the	accused	person	will	abscond,	attempt	
to	 interfere	 with	 witnesses	 or,	 with	 the	 integrity	 of	 justice	 processes,	 threaten	 to	 harm	 the	
victim,	 individuals	or	 the	community,	or	commit	 further	 serious	offences.	These	decisions	are	
best	made,	in	the	first	instance,	by	police	and	then,	on	review,	by	the	judiciary,	on	the	basis	of	
evidence	particular	 to	 the	specific	case	and	 the	 individual	circumstances.	A	person	accused	of	
homicide	 in	 relation	 to	 a	mercy	killing	of	 a	partner	 suffering	 long‐term	crippling	pain	 should	
probably	be	released	on	bail	pending	 the	trial;	an	accused	serial	or	contract	killer	should	not.	
This	is	a	matter	for	judicial	discretion,	not	for	politicians	to	decide	in	advance	through	creating	
complex	 categories	 of	 offence	 based	 presumptions	which	 cut	 across	 the	 ability	 to	 assess	 the	
individual	merits	of	cases.	Are	 these	principles	 too	difficult	 for	politicians	 to	comprehend	and	
defend?	
	
A	 common	mistake	 is	 to	 frame	 rule	 of	 law	 principles	 as	 individual	 interests,	 to	 be	 balanced	
against	public	or	social	interests.	This	error	was	noted	by	Judge	Cross	in	R	v	Wakefield.25	
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The	 error	 lies	 in	 seeing	 the	 interest	 in	 liberty,	 and	 indeed	 in	 the	 other	
fundamental	principles	of	the	law,	such	as	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	the	
right	to	a	fair	trial,	as	interests	of	the	individual	and	in	particular	the	individual	
defendant.	Conceiving	them	in	this	way,	within	the	familiar	metaphor	of	balance,	
renders	one	far	more	likely	to	see	them	as	of	less	weight	than	social,	community	
and	 public	 interests.	 [But]	 the	 interest	 in	 liberty	 and	 fundamental	 principles	 is	
correctly	 seen	 as	 a	 collective,	 social,	 public	 interest.	 The	 issue	 then	 is	 one	 of	
reconciling	 or	 evaluating	 the	 strength	of	 competing	public	 interests.	 (NSW	LRC	
2012:	para	3.12;	Brown,	2013:	87,	emphasis	in	original)	
	
Finally,	 the	 NSW	 bail	 reform	 reversal	 offends	 two	 other	 important	 legal	 principles,	 those	 of	
generality	 and	 of	 reciprocity.	 Laws	 should	 be	made	 after	 careful	 consideration	 in	 relation	 to	
general	 states	 of	 affairs,	 not	 in	 relation	 to	 individual	 cases.	 Constantly	 changing	 the	 law	 after	
media	outcries	over	particular	cases	offends	the	principle	of	generality	and	produces	distortions	
in	 the	 law	 for	 short‐term	 political	 gain.	 The	 principle	 of	 reciprocity	 is	 a	 form	 of	 social	 glue	
fundamental	to	a	safe	and	cohesive	society.	It	requires	that	we	should	want	the	same	laws	and	
legal	processes	applied	to	others	that	we	would	wish	to	be	in	operation	in	relation	to	ourselves,	
our	families	and	our	friends.	Shock	jocks	and	journalists	might	usefully	reflect	on	this	principle.	
	
Being	otherwise?	
The	rather	depressing	state	of	affairs	outlined	in	this	article	raises	the	question	of	how	might	it	
have	been	otherwise?	Russell	Hogg	(2013)	has	suggested	that	populism	should	be	taken	more	
seriously	as	a	political	rationality	and	that	the	common	characterisation	of	penal	populism	as	a	
form	of	pathology	or	irrationalism	is	politically	unproductive.	He	further	suggests	that	the	two	
terms	should	be	uncoupled,	paving	the	way	for	an	attempt	to	take	populism	more	seriously	and	
open	 up	 spaces	 for	 the	 mobilisation	 of	 more	 progressive	 forms	 of	 populism.	 We	 have	 not	
utilised	the	notion	of	penal	populism	directly	 in	this	article	but	certainly	an	underlying	theme	
has	been	the	sheer	irrationality	of	the	events	and	processes	we	have	outlined,	as	an	exercise	in	
law	reform.	A	possible	example	of	a	more	progressive	populist	response	leading	to	non‐punitive	
law	reform	may	be	found	in	the	initial	responses	to	the	death	from	one	punch	of	Thomas	Kelly	
in	 July	2012,	Kings	Cross,	Sydney.	 In	 this	 instance,	Quilter	 (2014c)	noted	 that	community	and	
government	responses	focussed	on	a	broad	range	of	regulatory	conditions	and	a	multi‐faceted	
response	to	address	alcohol‐related	violence	rather	than	simply	on	the	individual	culpability	of	
the	offender.	But,	as	with	Shoebridge’s	(2014)	comments	on	bail	reform	quoted	at	the	outset	of	
this	article,	this	also	turned	out	to	be	a	case	of	‘speaking	too	soon’.	The	political	response	to	the	
sentence	 originally	 given	 to	 Thomas	 Kelly’s	 killer,	 Kieran	 Loveridge,	 turned	 suddenly	 in	 the	
direction	 of	 a	 new	 ‘one	 punch	 law’,	 replete	with	 a	mandatory	 sentencing	 regime,	 which	was	
subsequently	adopted	in	different	forms	in	Victoria	and	Queensland.26	Indeed,	there	seems	little	
that	is	progressive	in	the	recent	rash	of	law	and	order	politics	and	legislation	across	a	number	of	
Australian	 jurisdictions.	Nevertheless,	 in	 the	spirit	of	Hogg’s	 suggestion,	we	will	 conclude	 this	
article	with	some	thoughts	and	questions	on	how	events	might	have	unfolded	otherwise.		
	
The	centrepiece	of	our	critique	has	been	the	appeal	to	evidence	as	a	requirement	for	considered	
public	 policy	 making	 and	 certainly	 for	 any	 sudden	 about‐turns.	 As	 argued	 above,	 statistical	
evidence	as	to	how	the	new	Act	was	working	was	not	yet	available	and	our	analysis	of	the	case	
law	evidence	 revealed	no	major	problems	 in	 interpretation	of	 the	Act.	 In	 the	absence	of	 such	
evidence,	two	major	arguments	were	mounted.	First,	the	Review	Report	pitched	its	objections	
to	the	new	legislation	at	the	level	of	policy	disagreement,	claiming	that	‘the	review	has	not	been	
hampered	by	 this	 lack	of	data,	 as	 it	 focuses	on	 the	underlying	policy	of	 the	Act’	 (Hatzistergos	
2014:	[46]).	The	policy	disagreement	is	that	‘on	no	basis	could	the	presumption	of	innocence	as	
referenced	in	section	3(2)	be	regarded	as	a	purpose	of	the	Act’	(Hatzistergos	2014:	[103]).	This	
amounted	to	a	repudiation	(by	simple	assertion)	of	the	more	detailed	and	careful	arguments	in	
the	NSW	LRC	Report	 (NSW	LRC	2012:	Ch	2)	previously	 accepted	by	 the	Government	and	 the	
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Parliament.	 Secondly,	 the	new	Attorney	General,	Brad	Hazzard,	 in	 the	 absence	of	 evidence	 to	
support	the	Government’s	position,	fell	back	on	that	old	favourite,	‘common	sense’;	the	Review	
Report	 recommendations	were	merely	 ‘common	 sense	 changes’	 (Hazzard	 2014:	 9).	 Law	 and	
order	‘commonsense’	has	a	long	pedigree.	As	argued	by	Hogg	and	Brown	(1998:	19):	
	
Commonsense	 is	 partial	 rather	 than	 wrong.	 By	 its	 very	 nature	 it	 resists	
engagement	with	other,	more	systematic	bodies	of	knowledge	where	these	resist	
commonsense	 assumptions.	 Commonsense	 is	 what	 ‘we	 all	 know’	 already.	 It	
embodies	 tacit	 judgments	and	assumptions	about	 the	world	 that	are	harboured	
prior	to	the	evidence	being	gathered.	This	is	what	makes	it	so	resistant	to	debate	
or	dialogue	which	questions,	rather	than	shares,	its	starting	points.	
	
Hogg	and	Brown	(1998:	21‐41)	 identify	 a	number	of	 ‘enduring	 themes’	within	 law	and	order	
‘commonsense’:	 soaring	 crimes	 rates;	 ‘it’s	 worse	 than	 ever’	 (law	 and	 order	 nostalgia);	 US	
comparisons	(the	shape	of	things	to	come);	soft	on	crime	(the	criminal	justice	does	not	protect	
citizens);	 ‘we	need	more	police	with	greater	powers’;	 ‘we	need	tougher	penalties’;	and	victims	
should	be	able	to	get	revenge	through	the	courts.	They	go	on	to	argue	that	there	is	an	‘uncivil’	
side	 to	 law	 and	 order	 commonsense	 and	 that	 it	 is	 to	 ‘the	 fallibility	 of	 the	 system	 and	 the	
importance	 of	 not	 committing	 further	 crimes	 in	 the	 name	 of	 justice,	 punishment,	 sacrifice	 or	
vengeance,	 that	 criminal	 justice	policy	 should	be	directed	 in	a	 civil	 society’	 (Hogg	 and	Brown	
2014:	43).	
	
Appeals	to	evidence,	rationality	and	process,	while	central	to	our	analysis	above	and,	hopefully,	
to	considered	criminal	justice	public	policy	making	(Hobbs	and	Hamerton	2014),	must	also	be	
translated	 into	 and	 through	 the	 forms	 of	 argument	 and	 the	 register	 of	 popular	 media	 and	
politics,	a	realm	in	which	emotion	and	affect	play	key	roles.	Criminal	justice	issues	arouse	strong	
emotions	and	lend	themselves	to	a	more	individualised	focus	than	other	types	of	news	stories.	
The	 focus	 is	 often	 on	 the	 victim,	 the	 language	 is	 emotive,	 constructing	 a	 virtual	 community	
around	 identification	 with	 particular	 high	 profile	 victims	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 cohesion	 that	 flows	
from	 widespread	 condemnation	 of	 the	 alleged	 offender	 (Quilter	 2014c).	 ‘Legal	 niceties’	 are	
often	 seen	 as	 just	 that,	 a	 formalistic	 overlay	which	 does	 not	 reflect	 or	 give	 expression	 to	 the	
personal	narratives	of	hurt,	loss,	outrage	and	revenge	that	swirl	around	specific	crimes.		
	
While	bail	decision‐making	is	a	procedural	stage	in	the	process	of	bringing	someone	to	trial	so	
that	their	culpability	can	be	decided,	it	has	increasingly	become,	as	we	argued	earlier,	a	forum	
for	 the	 condemnation	 of	 the	 accused	 and	 of	 their	 alleged	 behaviour,	 a	 moment	 where	
accusation,	guilt	and	punishment	are	conflated.	The	passage	of	 the	Act	was	an	attempt	to	shift	
bail	from	a	form	of	pre‐trial	preventive	detention	and	return	it	to	its	place	as	a	procedural	forum	
focussed	not	on	the	nature	of	 the	alleged	offence	but	 largely	on	whether	the	defendant	would	
present	 for	 trial	and	respect	 the	 integrity	of	 the	 trial	process,	 the	evidence,	witnesses,	victims	
and	 the	 community.	 The	 media	 outrage	 over	 the	 three	 specific	 bail	 decisions	 was	 focussed	
rather	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 alleged	 offences	 (in	 two	 cases,	 homicide),	 the	 gang	 affiliations	 of	
Mick	Hawi	and	Hassan	Ibrahim,	and	the	views	of	relatives	of	a	murder	victim.27		
	
Earlier	 we	 noted	 the	 vacuum	 that	 occurred	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 three	 contentious	 bail	
decisions,	 during	 which	 talk‐back	 radio	 and	 the	 Daily	 Telegraph28	 were	 able	 to	 portray	 the	
decisions	as	putting	the	public	at	risk,	doing	a	disservice	to	the	victims	and	their	relatives,	and	
indicating	 the	 new	 Act	 and	 the	 government	 were	 ‘soft	 on	 crime’.	 We	 noted	 that,	 without	
published	 reasons	 for	 the	 decisions	 being	made	 available,	 the	 opportunity	 to	mount	 counter	
arguments	to	the	 ‘outrage’	 line	was	restricted.	When	the	decisions	did	become	available,	after	
the	damage	had	been	done,	 they	seemed	cogent	and	explicable	 in	 two	of	 the	cases	and	 in	 the	
other,	an	appeal	was	successful.	If	courts	made	decisions	available	more	quickly,	commentators	
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would	be	better	placed	to	respond	and	it	is	possible	the	public	‘debate’,	such	as	it	is,	would	be	
better	informed	and	more	nuanced.	
	
Another	 question	worth	 some	 consideration	 is	 how	 both	 politicians	 and	 the	media	might	 be	
brought	 into	 some	 engagement	with	 the	 law	 reform	process	 in	ways	 that	makes	 them	better	
informed	 and	 more	 responsible?	 How	 was	 it	 possible	 for	 a	 Parliament	 that	 unanimously	
approved	and	passed	 the	new	Act	 in	May	2013,	 giving	 its	 imprimatur	 to	 the	 long	 law	 reform	
process,	 to	 perform	 such	 an	 about	 turn	 a	 year	 later	 and	 repudiate	 the	 key	 features	 of	 the	
legislation,	on	precious	 little	evidence	save	some	media	uproar	over	a	small	number	of	cases?	
What	 does	 this	 say	 about	 the	 level	 of	 commitment	 to	 legislative	 integrity	 and	 responsibility,	
about	 the	 quality	 of	 information	 provided	 to	 parliamentarians,	 about	 their	 comprehension	 of	
the	arguments	for	reform,	and	about	their	ability	to	articulate	and	defend	key	principles	central	
to	the	protection	of	legal	processes	and	liberties	in	a	democratic	society?	What	does	it	say	about	
the	way	 party	whip	 and	 caucus	 systems	 operate	 and	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 leadership,	 of	 both	
government	and	opposition?	Are	there	better	Committee	processes	that	might	have	been	used	
to	provide	some	greater	scrutiny	to	the	Review	Report	arguments?		
	
The	Parliament	of	NSW	Legislative	Review	Committee	commented	on	the	Bail	Amendment	Bill	
that:	 ‘In	 removing	 a	 requirement	 that	 the	 bail	 authority	 gives	 regard	 to	 the	 presumption	 of	
innocence	 and	 the	 general	 right	 of	 liberty	when	making	bail	 decisions,	 the	Bill	 impacts	 these	
rights.	The	Committee	refers	these	matters	to	Parliament	for	further	consideration.’	(Legislation	
Review	 Committee	 2014:	 vii)	 This	 referral	 to	 the	 parliament	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 ignored.	
Why?	 What	 exactly	 would	 have	 been	 wrong	 with	 referring	 the	 report	 to	 a	 parliamentary	
standing	committee	for	further	consideration,	as	proposed	by	the	Australian	Greens	party?	Why	
did	the	Australian	Labor	Party	(ALP)	opposition	roundly	criticise	the	Amendment	Bill	and	yet	
still	 vote	 for	 it	 (Whitbourn	 2014)?	 Shadow	Attorney	General	 Paul	 Lynch	 said	 in	 debate:	 ‘The	
Opposition	does	not	oppose	the	bill	but	it	thinks	the	Government	has	not	the	slightest	idea	what	
it	 is	doing’	 (Lynch	2014:	6).	ALP	MP	Ron	Hoenig	echoed	the	refrain:	 ‘the	Opposition	does	not	
oppose	 this	 convoluted,	 dreadful	 bill,	 but	 it	 is	 bad	 public	 policy	 created	 by	 a	 panicked	
Government	 trying	 to	 curry	 favour	with	 a	 reactionary	media’	 (Hoenig	 2014:	 9).	 As	Mr	 Jamie	
Parker,	 Australian	 Greens	 MP	 for	 Balmain	 noted:	 ‘Opposition	 members	 have	 made	 some	
incredibly	 strong	 arguments	 as	 to	 why	 the	 bill	 is	 faulty,	 poorly	 developed	 and	 attacks	
fundamental	rights,	why	it	waters	down	the	bedrock	of	our	justice	system	–	the	presumption	of	
innocence	–	and	trashes	judicial	expertise,	yet	the	Opposition	essentially	will	be	waving	the	bill	
through’	(Parker	2014:	11).	Why?	As	Mr	Parker	went	on	to	point	out:	‘If	Labor	were	to	oppose	
this	bill	it	would	present	us	with	an	opportunity	to	conduct	further	negotiations	to	improve	the	
bill	as	it	stands’	(Parker	2014:	12).		
	
What	do	we	make	of	the	fact	that	the	man	asked	to	complete	a	hasty	review	of	the	Act	had,	in	
2009,	while	Attorney	General,	 in	 the	 then	ALP	government,	 rejected	 the	overtures	of	 the	 then	
Opposition	 (Coalition)	 Shadow	 Attorney	 General,	 Smith,	 to	 develop	 a	 bi‐partisan,	 evidence	
driven,	 fairer,	and	 less	costly	criminal	 justice	policy,	 taking	criminal	 justice	out	of	 the	 law	and	
order	auction	(West	2009).	How	might	 the	business	of	criminal	 justice	policy	making	and	 law	
reform	have	been	different	if	Smith’s	offer	of	a	 ‘truce’	had	been	accepted,	rather	than	rejected	
(Robins	2009)?	These	questions	deserve	reflection,	for	the	attempt	to	formulate	answers	might	
illuminate	paths	to	a	different	process	and	a	different	outcome,	challenging	the	notion	that	the	
sabotage	of	bail	reform	in	NSW	was	somehow	inevitable.		
	
In	relation	to	the	law	reform	process	itself	it	is	evident	that	the	existing	extensive	consultative	
exercise	engaged	in	by	the	NSW	LRC	does	not	preclude	certain	parties	from	leaking	to	the	media	
prior	 to	 the	 finalisation	 of	 the	 final	 report,	 nor	 from	 continuing	 to	 try	 to	 undermine	
recommendations	they	do	not	agree	with	once	the	report	is	released.	In	short,	the	consultation	
process	does	not	seem	to	generate	a	sense	of	commitment	to	the	various	compromise	positions	
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inevitably	 reflected	 in	a	 final	 report	and	 in	 subsequent	 legislation.	This	 raises	 the	question	of	
whether	 different	 forms	 of	 consultative	 process	 might	 produce	 a	 more	 collective	 outcome.	
Might	 a	 ‘workshop’	 approach	built	 around	 selected	 scenarios,	 as	 later	 developed	by	 the	NSW	
Sentencing	Commission,29	work	better	to	focus	discussion,	highlight	the	empirical	evidence	and	
the	 various	 arguments,	 and	 generate	 a	 wider	 community	 consensus	 around	 compromise	
recommendations?		
	
To	push	such	thinking	even	further,	might	it	be	possible	for	sections	of	the	media	to	be	invited	
to	put	forward	submissions	to	law	reform	bodies	and	processes	or	to	be	somehow	involved	in	
the	 deliberative	 process?	 Such	 a	 suggestion	 sounds	 a	 bit	 farfetched,	 but	 certain	 media	
commentators	 clearly	 have	 very	 strong	 views	 on	 how	 particular	 legal	 processes	 ought	 to	
operate	and	 it	might	be	of	benefit	 if	 those	views	were	able	to	be	articulated	 in	a	general	way,	
divorced	from	specific	cases,	and	in	an	environment	that	encouraged	them	to	be	constructive.	If	
the	 Ray	 Hadleys	 and	 Daily	 Telegraph	 editors	 of	 the	 world	 could	 somehow	 be	 given	 a	 voice	
during	the	official	process	of	law	reform	policy	formulation,	the	very	process	of	engagement	and	
of	having	 to	come	to	 terms	with	some	of	 the	underlying	principles	and	alternative	arguments	
might	make	them	a	little	less	inclined	to	try	to	trump	or	undermine	the	results	down	the	track,	
results	in	which	they,	as	outsiders	to	the	law	reform	consultation	process,	have	no	stake.	
	
Another	challenge	to	be	confronted	is	how	to	generate	good	news	stories	in	a	media	climate	that	
thrives	on	highlighting	dysfunction	and	failure.	The	outcome	of	the	Greg	Smith‐initiated	bail	law	
reform	process	might	have	been	covered	in	a	very	different	way.	With	25	per	cent	of	the	NSW	
prison	population	unconvicted	at	the	time,	between	2500	and	3000	people	at	any	one	time	and	
more	than	10,000	over	the	course	of	a	year	in	NSW	(72.4	per	cent	of	total	prison	receptions	in	
2010:	NSW	LRC	2012:	[4.6]),	the	system	was	ripe	for	reform.	Not	only	is	the	system	extremely	
costly	 in	monetary	 terms,	 its	 social	 consequences	are	profoundly	dysfunctional.	They	 include:	
physical	and	psychological	hardship;	assaults	and	deaths	 in	custody;	 financial	 implications	 for	
the	accused	and	their	 family;	deleterious	effects	on	children;	 the	criminogenic	effect	of	mixing	
with	sentenced	prisoners	and	high	risk	remandees;	the	lack	of	access	to	any	programs;	a	range	
of	effects	on	the	ability	to	receive	a	fair	trial,	and	on	conviction	rates;	pressure	to	plead	guilty;	
and	others	(see	NSW	LRC:	Ch	5;	Grunseit	et	al.	2008).	
	
The	enactment	of	the	Act	was	potentially	a	good	news	story:	more	people	would	be	granted	bail;	
prison	 numbers	 would	 be	 reduced;	 considerable	 financial	 savings	 would	 be	 achieved;	
Corrective	Services	would	be	freed	up	from	processing	so	many	people	received	into	prison	on	
remand	 for	 minor	 offences,	 enabling	 them	 to	 concentrate	 resources	 on	 programs	 for	 the	
convicted;	 better	 justice	would	be	 achieved	 for	 the	55	per	 cent	of	 those	 on	 remand	 (5,218	of	
10,342)	 who	 in	 2010	 in	 NSW	 were	 subsequently	 released	 to	 bail,	 received	 a	 non‐custodial	
sentence	 or	 were	 acquitted	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 [4.13]);	 fewer	 lives	 would	 be	 disrupted;	 the	
criminogenic	(crime	producing)	effect	of	being	sent	to	prison	would	be	reduced;	and	so	on.		
	
It	is	our	understanding	that	at	least	one	journalist	was	researching	a	story	along	these	lines	to	
coincide	with	 the	new	Act	 coming	 into	operation	but	 decided	not	 to	 go	 ahead.	 It	would	have	
been	timely	to	produce	a	follow	up	story	to	the	one	written	by	Joel	Gibson	in	the	Sydney	Morning	
Herald	 in	 2010	 under	 the	 headline	 ‘No	 Bail	 Go	 to	 Jail’,	 which	 focussed	 on	 the	 bashing	 of	 a	
subsequently	acquitted	remand	prisoner,	and	which	was	a	vehicle	 for	explaining	Greg	Smith’s	
reformist	 agenda	 (Gibson	2010).	 Journalistic	 traditions	of	 ‘more	bad	news’	 tend	 to	 gel	with	 a	
widespread	 political	 reluctance	 to	 argue	 for	 progressive	 change.	 This	 is	 a	 version	 of	 ‘don’t	
mention	the	war’;	or,	in	this	case,	don’t	mention	that	the	government	might	be	doing	something	
other	than	taking	a	‘tough’	(read	punitive)	stand	on	crime	and	punishment.	Governments	of	all	
persuasions	 are	 happy	 to	 trumpet	 an	 increase	 in	 penalties	 but	 often	 prefer	 to	 remain	 silent	
about	 programs	 or	 initiatives	 which	 attempt	 to	 reduce	 imprisonment	 rates,	 provide	
rehabilitative	 programs	 or	 post	 release	 assistance,	 as	 if	 they	 are	 embarrassed	 by	 sound	 and	
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constructive	reform	outcomes,	or	fear	that	they	may	be	an	electoral	risk	for	being	insufficiently	
draconian.	 These	 attitudes	 have	 led	 to	 the	 entrenching	 of	 a	 ‘reform	 on	 the	 sly’	 approach,	
whereby	more	 progressive	 social	 and	welfare	 approaches	 to	 criminal	 justice	 issues,	 however	
much	evidence	can	be	marshalled	in	their	favour	and	however	successful,	are	not	promoted	lest	
they	draw	adverse	attention	and	claims	of	being	‘soft	on	crime’,	the	automatic	assumption	being	
that	 the	 public	 are	 universally	 punitive,	 a	 ‘common	 sense’	 notion	 challenged	 by	 research	
(Roberts	et	al.	2003).	One	effect	of	this	approach	is	that	little	on‐going	public	support	is	built	for	
reformist	measures.	So	when	the	spotlight	is	shone	on	a	sound	and	carefully	constructed	reform	
initiative	like	the	Act,	and	media	and	political	criticisms	emerge,	there	is	little	well	informed	and	
widespread	 public	 support	 to	 point	 out	 that,	 despite	 the	 specific	 ‘weakness’	 that	 has	 been	
identified,	the	initiative	is	meritorious	and	beneficial	(and	at	the	very	least,	worth	being	allowed	
to	 ‘bed	down’	before	 judgment	 is	passed	on	 it).	Because	 the	discursive	ground	 for	 this	sort	of	
insulating	strategy	has	not	been	prepared,	punitive	and	exclusionary	responses	quickly	swamp	
the	field.	
	
Unfortunately,	this	was	the	unfavourable	environment	into	which	the	work	of	the	NSW	LRC	and	
Greg	Smith’s	bail	reform	legislation	emerged.	The	fact	that	the	legislation’s	aims	were	eminently	
sensible	–	making	bail	easier	to	obtain	would	both	alleviate	the	injustice	of	pre‐trial	detention	
for	many	 accused	 and	 reduce	 the	 remand	 population	 in	 NSW	 prisons	 –	 was	 lost	 amidst	 the	
shouting	and	the	fear‐mongering.	The	ease	and	rapidity	with	which	these	laudable	goals	of	the	
new	 Act	 came	 to	 be	 characterised	 as	 undesirable	 and	 dangerous,	 effects	 ‘proved’	 by	 the	
outcomes	in	three	contentious	cases,	is	troubling.	Conspiratorial	theories	were	floated	including	
the	 suggestion	 that	 any	 increase	 in	 the	 proportion	 of	 accused	 persons	 being	 granted	 bail	
(characterised	in	the	media	as	a	‘bad’	thing)	could	be	attributable	to	deliberate	manipulation	by	
the	NSW	Police,	as	part	of	a	strategy	to	undermine	the	new	Act	(Olding	2014).	Police	Association	
President	 Scott	 Weber	 countered	 that	 it	 was	 ‘the	 judiciary	 not	 enforcing	 the	 community	
standards’	that	was	the	reason	for	any	increase	in	the	success	rate	of	bail	applications	(Olding	
2014).	Could	it	be	that	if	bail	rates	do	increase	and	the	remand	population	shrinks	(it	is	far	too	
soon	to	tell),	that	neither	police	sabotage	nor	judges	being	‘out	of	touch’	 is	the	cause?	Might	it	
simply	be	 that	police,	magistrates	and	 judges	are	 just	 carrying	out	 the	 intentions	behind,	and	
applying	the	principles	in,	the	Act?30		
	
Worthwhile	 law	 reform	 takes	 time.	 It	 requires	 ongoing	 political	 commitment,	 constant	
justification	and	community	and	media	engagement.	 It	 involves	restatement	of	the	underlying	
principles	 governing	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 full	 recourse	 to	 the	 available	 evidence,	 and	
recognition	that	sound	and	effective	reform	cannot	be	done	‘on	the	sly’	if	it	is	to	command	wide	
respect	and	be	resilient	 in	 the	 face	of	anticipated	attacks.	Rather	 than	 ‘speaking	 too	soon’	 the	
key	problem	may	be	not	speaking	soon	or	often	enough.	
	
Postscript	
The	following	developments	took	place	after	the	completion	of	this	article.	
	
On	 10	 September	 2014,	 the	 NSW	 Attorney	 General,	 bypassing	 the	 NSW	 Law	 Reform	
Commission,	 asked	 the	 NSW	 Sentencing	 Council	 to	 consider	 a	 proposal	 to	 make	 further	
amendments	 to	 the	Bail	Act	2013	 (NSW)	 on	whether	 	 a	 new	 ‘show	 cause’	 offence	 should	 be	
added	 to	 the	 Act.	 The	 specific	 addition	 under	 consideration	 is	 with	 respect	 to	 an	 accused	
charged	with	a	serious	indictable	offence	committed:	
	
 while	 subject	 to	 a	 good	 behaviour	 bond,	 intervention	 program	 order,	 intensive	
correction	order;		
 while	serving	a	sentence	in	the	community;	or	
 while	in	custody.	
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We	made	a	submission	to	the	NSW	Sentencing	Council	arguing	against	the	proposal.		
	
The	Sentencing	Council	is	not	due	to	report	on	this	matter	until	May	2015,	after	the	March	2015	
NSW	State	election.	
	
On	 10	 October	 2014,	 Attorney	 General	 Hazzard	 announced	 the	 appointment	 of	 John	
Hatzistergos	as	a	judge	of	the	NSW	District	Court.		
	
Finally,	in	spite	of	the	Government’s	claim	that	there	was	a	pressing	need	to	amend	the	Bail	Act	
2013	 the	 Bail	 Amendment	 Act	 2014	 passed	 on	 17	 September	 2014	 has	 still	 not	 commenced	
operation	 –	 almost	 three	months	 later.	We	 note	 that	 this	 ‘waiting	 period’	 is	 longer	 than	 the	
period	for	which	the	Bail	Act	2013	was	in	operation	before	an	urgent	review	was	announced	by	
the	Government.	
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resignation	 as	 Premier	 for	misleading	 the	NSW	 Independent	 Commission	 Against	 Corruption.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	
with	a	more	experienced	Premier	(together	with	a	more	experienced	Attorney	General,	Brad	Hazzard	having	only	
been	Attorney	from	23	April	2014	in	Baird’s	Cabinet	reshuffle)	the	premature	step	of	reviewing	bail	laws	may	not	
have	been	undertaken.		
9	Bail	Act	1977	(Vic)	s	4;	Bail	Act	1980	(Qld)	s	16.	
10	Such	as	applications	to	detain	offenders	after	the	expiration	of	a	sentence	or	where	family	law	orders	are	designed	
to	 protect	 children	 and	 as	 part	 of	 the	 sentencing	 process	 when	 suggestions	 of	 future	 dangerousness	 arise:	
Alexandridis:	[33];	Lago:	[10]‐[12].	
11	The	discussion	of	(c)	and	(d)	was	redacted	in	the	published	version	of	the	Hawi	decision.	
12	A	 ‘Judgment	Summary’	 in	R	v	Hawi	 [2014]	NSWSC	837	was	made	available	on	23	 June	2014	(Supreme	Count	of	
NSW	 2014a).	 Unfortunately,	 the	 Judgment	 Summary	 (now	 unavailable	 on	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 website)	 did	 not	
disclose	 the	 reasons	 for	 granting	 bail	 only	 that	 the	 ‘unacceptable	 risks’	 could	 be	 mitigated	 by	 bail	 conditions.	
Unusually	in	the	judgment	the	orders	include	at	[58]:	‘3.	I	direct	that	an	unredacted	form	of	this	judgment	is	not	to	
be	published,	other	than	to	the	Attorney	General,	until	further	order.’	The	judgment	was	finally	made	available	in	
early	August	2014.	
13	A	redacted	version	of	the	decision	in	Fesus	was	made	available	some	days	later	and	Adams	J	commented	‘Because	
of	the	ensuing	publicity,	I	have	decided	that	some	parts	of	my	reasons	should	be	published.’	(Fesus:	[1])	
14	Originally	only	a	 ‘Judgment	Summary:	Hawi	v	R	 [2014]	NSWCCA	83’	(Bathurst	CJ,	Price	and	McCallum	JJ,	16	May	
2014)	(see	Supreme	Court	of	NSW	2014b)	was	made	available,	however,	after	Hawi	pleaded	guilty	to	manslaughter	
on	5	September	2014	the	judgment	was	published:	Hawi	v	R	[2014]	NSWCCA	83.	
15	Although	that	view	is	not	beyond	question,	see	for	instance,	Wacando	v	Commonwealth	(1981)	148	CLR	1	at	15‐16	
(Gibbs	CJ),	23	(Mason	J)	which	indicates	that	a	court	can	obtain	assistance	from	the	preamble	in	ascertaining	the	
meaning	of	an	operative	provision.	See	also	Pearce	and	Geddes	(2011:	[4.48]).	
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16	The	new	factors	(s	18(1)(f),	(g),	(n),	(o)	and	(p))	emphasise	the	rhetoric	of	‘tough	on	crime’	and	protection	of	the	
community	with	an	accused’s	criminal	associations	(g)	and	the	views	of	victims	and	their	families	(n),	(o)	becoming	
factors.	
17	We	note	a	contra	argument	in	Flowchart	2	in	the	Bail	Amendment	Act	2014	(NSW)	which	suggests	the	s	18	factors	
are	taken	into	account.	The	Flowchart,	however,	is	‘illustrative’	only	(s	16(3))	and	s	19	does	not	so	provide.	
18	In	the	debate	on	the	Bill,	Lynch	(2014:	4)	decscribed	the	proposition	that	a	show‐cause	test	can	be	distinguished	
from	the	 former	presumptions	as:	 ‘That	 is	an	 interesting	argument—almost	as	 interesting	as	arguing	about	how	
many	angels	can	fit	on	the	head	of	a	pin.’	
19	Hatzistergos	(2014:	[223])	indicates	that	in	Victoria	there	is	a	divergence	of	authority	on	whether	the	question	of	
unjustifiable	risk	falls	to	be	determined	as	part	of	showing	cause	or	whether,	it	is	an	additional	matter	that	needs	to	
be	determined	if	the	accused	successfully	shows	cause.	However,	the	recent	decision	of	Woods	v	DPP	[2014]	VSC	1	
suggests	that	the	defendant	must	first	discharge	the	onus	of	showing	cause	and	then	the	prosecution	must	establish	
unacceptable	risk.	
20	See	Lacey	&	Lacey	v	DPP	[207]	QSC	291;	Van	Tongeren	v	ODPP	(Qld)	[2013]	QMC	16	at	[110]‐[116].	
21	Although	it	is	noted	that	this	argument	assumes	the	unacceptable	risk	assessment	references	back	to	s	18,	which	is	
not	clear	(as	discussed	above).	
22	Part	of	a	more	general	‘anti‐elites’	politics	(Hindess	and	Sawyer	2004).	
23	This	 is	part	of	a	more	general	phenomenon	described	by	Ryan	(2005)	as	 ‘the	rise	of	the	public	voice’,	by	Loader	
(2006)	as	the	‘fall	of	the	platonic	guardians’,	and	by	Garland	as	the	‘declining	influence	of	social	expertise’	(Garland	
2001:	150).		
24	For	a	previous	NSW	example,	see	Tink	and	Whelan	2013.	
25	R	v	Wakefield	(1969)	83	WN	(Pt	1)	(NSW)	300	at	325.	
26	 See	 Safe	Night	Out	Legislation	Amendment	Act	2014	 (Qld)	 s	 314A	 ‘Unlawful	 striking	 causing	 death’	 (which	was	
passed	on	18	September	2014);	Sentencing	Amendment	(Coward’s	Punch	Manslaughter	and	Other	Matters)	Act	2014	
(Vic)	 s	4A	 ‘Manslaughter	–	 single	punch	or	strike	 taken	 to	be	dangerous	act’;	 and	Sentencing	Act	1991	 (Vic)	 s	9C	
which	provides	for	a	mandatory	minimum	for	such	offences	of	10	years	(passed	on	18	September	2014).	
27	See	 for	 instance	Dale	et	al	2014	 in	relation	 to	reporting	on	the	grant	of	bail	 to	Fesus	and	Morri	and	Auerback	T	
2014	in	relation	to	Hawi.	
28	While	we	have	emphasised	the	leading	role	played	by	the	Daily	Telegraph	in	undermining	the	new	bail	reforms,	it	
should	be	noted	that	the	Sydney	Morning	Herald	(SMH)	promoted	the	‘community	anxiety	about	new	laws’	line,	a	
theme	that	was	particularly	evident	in	some	articles;	for	instance	of	Paul	Bibby	(see	Bibby	2014b)	as	did	radio	talk	
back	 hosts	 not	 usually	 in	 the	 ‘shock	 jock’	 mode,	 such	 as	 Richard	 Glover	 on	 ABC	 702.	 It	 was	 only	 when	 the	
Government	announced	the	Hatzistergos	Review	that	the	SMH	became	more	critical	and	questioned	its	timing:	see	
Bibby	and	Whitbourn	(2014).	
29	See	note	4	above.	
28	For	example	The	NSW	LRC	[15:35]	recommended	the	listing	of	responses	available	to	police	where	they	suspect	a	
failure	 to	comply	with	a	conduct	direction,	as	a	response	to	suggestions	that	police	had	no	options	but	 to	arrest.	
This	was	incorporated	in	the	Act	(s	77(1)	with	options	to	take	no	action,	issue	a	warning,	issue	a	Court	Attendance	
Notice	 or	 arrest.	 The	 intention	 was	 that	 the	 proportion	 of	 revocations	 of	 bail	 for	 minor	 technical	 breaches	 be	
reduced.	 Brown	 (2013)	 suggests	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 drop	 in	 juvenile	 detentions	 that	 ‘it	 may	 be	 that	 the	 debate	
surrounding	the	Law	Reform	Commission	Inquiry	and	Report	and	the	Attorney	General’s	response	has	already	had	
an	effect	on	bail	decision‐makers	and	on	the	complex	organisational	and	cultural	climate,	in	the	direction	of	a	more	
“resilient”	attitude	to	the	grant	of	bail’.	(Brown,	2013:95).	
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